The coach’s decision to go for it is the right call if you think the Falcons’ chances of converting on fourth down are at least 56 percent. But based on my analysis, I’d give the Falcons only a 10 percent chance to get a first down here.
Here's the full breakdown of my calculations:
Option  Chance of converting 
Chance of winning
Before play

After play  Change  

Field goal try46 yard kick (est.)  76%  72%  74%  +2%  
Punt  72%  68%  –4%  
Go for it4th and 19, opp. 29  10%  72%  65%  –7% 
Along with some circuitry to come up with a win probability for every game situation, all you need to figure out what you should do next is an estimate of how likely you are to make a field goal or convert a first down.
My estimates for these are based on the results of thousands of similar plays, but you may think you're smarter than I am. This chart shows you how changing those estimates would change my recommendation.
If the coach had attempted a field goal instead of going for it, I estimate the Falcons’ chances of winning would be about 74 percent instead of 65 percent.
Based on about 1,385 fourth downs in similar situations since 2001.
Devonta Freeman rush to the right for 1 yard to the Jax28. Devonta Freeman rush to the right for 1 yard to the Jax28.
To estimate a team’s chances of winning, I use a mathematical model that accounts for a whole lot of variables — including the difference in score, the time remaining in the game, and the number of timeouts each team has left. On top of that, I have models for the likelihood that a team makes a field goal and the likelihood that it will convert a first down.
By combining all of this information, I can come up with the best decision a team can make, according to math.
If you want even more details about the numbers behind my decisions, my full model is available on GitHub. Help make me better!